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Abstract
The aim of the article is to analyse Polish stance on the h1n1 of 2009 and 2010, 
which was completely inconsistent with who’s official guidelines. Faced with a pos-
sible bioterrorist threat it is inexpedient to question the credibility of organisations 
such as who. Yet on the other hand, who should also develop better understand-
ing and relationships with the governments but most of all strive for the best possible 
transparency of its actions. 
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“The problem if bio-terrorism does not have too much effect on the majority 
of people simply because there has never been any serious situation related to 
it on a large scale”.
r. james woolsey
H1N1 iN tHe fAce of bioterrorism tHreAt
h1n1 pandemic showed a lot of very important problems in the state of pre-
paredness in case of bioterrorism threat. in both — bioterrorism attack and pan-
demic, reaction would be in large extent similar. except of chasing the terrorists 
who would cause the attack, any other method of dealing with the disease would 
be very similar in both cases. But the most significant would be the problem of 
quick and fully trusted information flow after the bioterrorism act would occur. 
Quick and credible information is so essential, because Bioterrorism is regarded 
by many as the most dangerous, man-made, security threat in the 21st century. 
it is hard to predict how the attack could be launched, by what means or what 
pathogen, and how fast the disease would spread. in such an uncertain situation, 
it would be best to have general agreement between decision makers about the 
real threat and about measures to take, clear and quick information available for 
the people, cooperation and trust between the key departments in the govern-
ments. however, the h1n1 pandemic from 2009 and 2010 showed that the cur-
rent situation is far from ideal. although it is obligatory to stipulate that during 
last h1n1 pandemic many actions were launched in right way, in this paper will 
be brought to light only those aspects which caused confusion and broke the 
solidarity of the organizations and countries in dealing with the problem. 
only one country which did not comply with who (world health organi-
zation) guidelines and international pressure was Poland. Polish government 
chose original way of dealing with the pandemic situation which caused diverse 
consequences. 
The aim of this article is to present the reasons of Polish decisions, as the 
consequences of ambiguity of who’s actions during the h1n1 pandemic. The 
paper illustrates how essential is that organizations like who are fully reliable 
and trusted in case of bioterrorist acts and what problems can be caused if there 
are ambiguities and unclear intentions. in this respect it is important to exam-
ine Poland’s decisions of choosing its own path of dealing with the pandemic 
differently than advised by who. it may provide a useful example in the face 
of preparation for a possible bioterrorist attack. 
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The main failure in the case of h1n1 was the malfunctioning information 
system. There were a lot of unchecked information which spread in the world 
with high speed but very few official statements of organizations responsible for 
health in global sense. also such organizations (especially world health or-
ganization who) were not enough prominent in all actions during so serious 
situation. it seems there are no clear rules for the people working for who, as 
to not be hired in the same time in the pharmaceutics companies which in such 
cases act as the business firms (which is obvious). so what was most dramatic 
in this case, it looked like there are no bodies independent from all sides of the 
h1n1 situation (pharmaceutics companies, governments, peoples). 
The example of h1n1 pandemic situation from 2009 showed that while the 
reaction of the people was often dubious and suspicious of the possible frauds, 
in the same time the panic was spreading rapidly producing great losses for 
the minor companies or threat to other people1. The panic was often amplified 
(consciously or unconsciously) by the politicians and governments2. 
The whole system composed of preparation, reaction and dealing with the 
consequences of the bioterrorist attack should be built as a strong construction 
based on the trust to the specialists in this field. The professional management3 
and trust, in the information spread by authorised institutions are crucial in 
case of threat caused by terrorism, but especially in bioterrorism threat situa-
tions. 
VAcciNAtioN duriNg H1N1 pANdemic
after the pandemic of the h1n1 (swine flu) was announced, the position of 
who became very much unclear. There were serious doubts about the pressure 
of the pharmaceutics companies on the governments to buy huge numbers of 
vaccines and medicines and the role of who which advised to do like the phar-
1 h. ashraf, The Phillips report on Bse and vcjd, The lancet 356, 2000, p. 1579–1580. This 
article illustrates how heavy losses can be met if the proper information politic is not provided. 
only the popular name of the pandemic “swine flu” caused huge problems for the farmers and 
minor companies. 
2 l.h. kahn, who’s in charge? leadership during epidemics, Bioterror attacks, and other 
Public health crises, santa Barbara, denver, oxford 2009, p. 90–91.
3 s. orton, k. umble, M.V. davis, j.e. Porter, disasters and Bioterrorism: does management 
training develop readiness?, Public health reports 6, nov.–dec. 2002, p. 596–598.
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maceutics companies required. The only country which refused to buy those 
vaccines was Poland4. This decision was not easy as Polish political opposition 
used who’s statement to attack the government’s position. at the same time 
Germany, France, italy, Great Britain, usa, canada and many other countries 
bought a huge mumber of those medicaments — especially vaccines — and 
started to treat people from so-called risk groups. the role of who and the
of course more and more information appeared about the number of the 
infected but the tendency showed that it did not increase so much as the pan-
demic situation would suggest5. time showed that not much changed and peo-
ple were sick and recovered even without vaccines. Moreover, the number of 
people infected or even dead in case of swine flu and seasonal flu was similar. 
in Germany the government tried to emphasize that it was so because they 
had treated the risk groups and that is why the pandemic was not spreading 
any further. But one country which made the exception by not buying those 
vaccines (i.e. Poland) was not fitting to this context. when we look at the num-
bers, which cannot lie, we can see that e.g. on 7th december 2009 there were 
53.12 cases of swine flu per million citizens in Poland, but in the same time in 
Germany there were 2,705.87cases, in France 76.88, in the uk 461.69 and in 
the usa — 375.796.
iNVestigAtioN iN cAse of Necessity of buyiNg VAcciNes
Because of those ambiguities, some governments7, journalists8 and even 
european union9 agencies started their independent investigations. The results 
4 V. Gera, Poland refuses swine Flu Vaccine, drug discovery & development, january 18, 
2010.
5 M. Fox, swine flu death rate similar to seasonal flu: expert, health and science editor, 
reuters washington 16.09.2009. http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/09/16/us-flu-deaths-
idustre58e6nz20090916.
6 Flucount.org.
7 w. engdahl, who ‘swine Flu Pope’ under investigation for gross conflict of interest, 
december 8, 2009. http://www.oilgeopolitics.net/swine_Flu/Flu_Pope/flu_pope.html.
8 d. cohen, conflicts of interest, who and the pandemic flu “conspiracies”, BMc (British 
Medical association) 2010; 340:c2912.
9 r. watson council of europe launches investigation into h1n1 pandemic BMj (British 
Medical association) 2010; 340:c641.
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of those investigations suggested that some group of health care specialists tried 
to exploit the hysteria when it occurred10.
according to a report by the social, health and Family affairs committee 
of the Parliamentary assembly of the council of europe (Pace) the way who 
tried to solve the situation with the h1n1 virus by calling it a pandemic in 
cooperation with the majority of the national governments led to a “waste of 
large sums of public money, and unjustified scares and fears about the health 
risks faced by the european public”11. Paul Flynn, the author of the report, told 
the committee that: “this was a pandemic that never really was”, and pointed 
out that the vaccination programme acted as “placebo medicine on a large 
scale”12.
another detailed investigation disclosed individual involvement of who 
employees or people related to it in pharmaceutical companies who were re-
sponsible for preparing the vaccines and other medicines and thus earned large 
sums of money because of the pandemic13. it again put this organisation into 
bad light as it suggested that it was a great business although there is no proof 
there was a real danger to the people at the same time. 
The response from who determined that the threat was not as large as they 
were accused to announce:
“who has consistently assessed the impact of the current influenza pan-
demic as moderate. who has consistently reminded the medical community, 
public, and media that the overwhelming majority of patients experience mild 
influenza-like illness and recover fully within a week, even without any form 
of medical treatment”14.
10 w. engdahl, who ‘swine Flu Pope’ under investigation for gross conflict of interest, 
8 december 2009. http://www.oilgeopolitics.net/swine_Flu/Flu_Pope/flu_pope.html.
11 P. Flynn The handling of the h1n1 pandemic: more transparency needed, social health 
and Family affairs committee report, june 04, 2010; http://assembly.coe.int/commit-
teedocs/2010/20100604_h1n1 pandemic_e.pdf.
12 Pace health committee denounces ‘unjustified scare’ of swine Flu, waste of public money, 
Press release 455(2010) strasbourg, june 04, 2010.
13 r. ramesh, report condemns swine flu experts’ ties to big pharma, The Guardian, june 
04, 2010.
14 who use of advisory bodies in responding to the influenza pandemic, Pandemic (h1n1) 
2009 briefing note 19, 03.12.2009; http://www.who.int/csr/disease/swineflu/notes/brief-
ing_20091203/en/index.html.
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But even one of the weekly reports of strategic advisory Group of experts 
(saGe)15 of who showed that half a year before the situation had been much 
more complex. Many passages from this report suggest real danger. we can 
guess how serious the situation was when we look at the numbers of the vac-
cines produced. The authors of the report state that the number of vaccines 
“has been revised down from 4.5 billion to 3 billion doses of pandemic (h1n1) 
2009 vaccine during the next 12 months”. if we bear in mind that most of the 
patients needed to get just one dose of the vaccine, the numbers gives the great 
impression as their target was almost half of the world population. of course 
this production was not only preventive but there were contracts with the gov-
ernments as well. all this shows quite a different picture than the one shown 
in the who’s response. 
iNVestigAtioN effects 
Those examples could imply that not everything was so clear, especially that 
similar problems had occurred also in the past16. Moreover, it is impossible 
to find in the who’s responses any detailed description of the connections 
between the who experts, pharmaceutical industry and the governments. 
as the aim of this paper is not to conduct another investigation against who, 
these examples are sufficient to show that not everything was as comprehensible 
as it seemed. in this case the most significant problem is the reliability of the 
organisation whose responsibility lies in alerting the whole world about the 
real health threats. The european council also found this problem crucial for 
the world security17, but it was not raised in the public discussion with enough 
emphasis. 
taking into consideration the credibility of the organization which is cru-
cial for the bioterrorism warning, in such a situation like pandemic in 2009 it 
15 weekly epidemiological record relevé épidémiologique hebdomadaire, 4 december 2009, 
84th year / 4 décembre 2009, 84e année. 49, 2009, 84, p. 505–516. 
16 e. sciolino, anthrax vaccination program is failing, Pentagon admits, new York times, 
july 13, 2000; h.w. cohen, r.M. Gould, V.w. sidel, Bioterrorism “Preparedness”: dual use or 
Poor excuse? Public health reports, 9–10.2000 (i 15).
17 P. Flynn, The handling of the h1n1 pandemic: more transparency needed, social health 
and Family affairs committee report, 04.06.2010, in paragraph a, draft resolution 2. http://
assembly.coe.int/committeedocs/2010/20100604_h1n1pandemic_e.pdf.
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is not enough just to say that “the influenza pandemic policies and responses 
recommended and taken by the who were not improperly influenced by the 
pharmaceutical industry”, as dr keiji Fukuda, who special advisor on the 
Pandemic influenza, did when he was trying to reject accusations levelled at 
who18. 
as bioterrorism involves the intentional release or dissemination of bio-
logical agents (e.g. viruses), we can consider such natural spread diseases as 
a kind of test of the readiness for bioterrorist attack. it must be remembered 
that people need some authority in many medical cases. Medical doctors can 
inform their patients but medical information on the mass scale should come 
from reliable sources. to be reliable they need to be not only honest but also 
visible. There are numbers of possible actions which can be taken during threat 
situations to help people and to give them feeling that who cares about them. 
The discussion about vaccines and other medicaments does not seem enough 
to enhance credibility for the organization. however, there are some easy ideas 
how to do it without generating great costs for both who and patients. First 
of all, information flow could be directed to the health centres and hospitals. 
There could be some well prepared leaflets sent via the internet to all health care 
institutions around the world. The leaflets may provide instructions e.g. how to 
organize the admission of patients with h1n1 and other diseases. even if such 
an action was not really needed and only aimed at raising the feeling of security, 
it would be appreciated very highly. about such actions we could hear in some 
countries but it was done from their own initiatives. in addition, there should 
be more information explaining the reasons for taking the who’s actions tar-
geted to all the people, not only the specialists. Those and many other actions 
would not generate many costs, but would give much better impression than 
the struggle for buying vaccines. The actions that were to increase the who’s 
visibility were not sufficient from the perspective of an ordinary patient. 
reAsoNs of polisH decisioNs
what is important in perspective of possibility of bioterrorist attack is that 
Polish stance to some extend questioned the reliability of who and pharma-
18 “who rejects council of europe h1n1 accusations”, 26.01.2011; http://www.euronews.
net. 
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ceutical companies. if Polish decisions had been just to save money, the bad 
effects for the safety in case of bioterrorism would be unpredictable. But if it 
had been from some significant reasons, then the change in the who’s acting 
would have been necessary. 
in this case it is crucial to examine what influenced Polish decision mak-
ing process. we have to stress how difficult the situation of Polish authorities 
was.
The most important for this paper are the consequences of the government’s 
reaction mode in case of biological terrorism attack. while considering this 
matter we have to be careful not to go into any of extremities. The main thing 
is to find the “golden mean” as aristotle expounded19. on the one hand, Poland 
saved large amount of money, but on the other, some people can accuse the 
government of creating unnecessary risk for the society. 
we have a lot of information what were the bases of Polish decisions, if 
they did not want to evoke panic and the risk was calculated, or there were 
some reasons to believe that risk was not so high as the investigators had sug-
gested. The reasons of the actions taken by Polish government were not only 
the budget matters. There were also problems with the tests on those vaccines. 
according to Polish health Minister ewa kopacz, “The a/h1n1 vaccine is 
being produced by three companies, none of which has been able to assess its 
long-term effects”20. even after european commission clearance and who 
recommendations for the vaccines it was not enough to change her and Polish 
Prime Minister’s mind. 
Polish Ministry of health said, as the explanation of Polish decision of not 
buying the vaccines, that one of the main reasons was the offer of a contract be-
tween pharmaceutical companies and Polish government, in which the respon-
sibility for the long term effects would be only on the side of Polish authorities21. 
she stated that it was a precedent that the company which produced medicines 
did not want to take responsibility for their product. in this case it seems that 
such a contract should not be the matter of business relations only. 
19 aristotle, nicomachean ethics.
20 M. olik, Poland and the h1n1 Flu: calm and unvaccinated, a/h1n1 in Poland, Global 
research, november 15, 2009. http://www.globalresearch.ca/.
21 Ministry ewa kopacz repeated it many times in the interviews and parliament speeches, 
i.e. http://www.flu-treatments.com/h1n1_vaccine.html; http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yn
3elokqnd0&feature=related.
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in the same time Poland was fighting with he global crisis and it’s choices 
were different from most of the countries in the world. in this case polish way 
was success, what even american economists noticed and appreciated very 
high22. This could be one of the reasons, that when in the face of very difficult 
and unclear situation during the h1n1 pandemic, polish government again 
chose it’s own way.
it is necessary also to consider what would have happened if it had been in 
fact a bioterrorist attack. of course if the government would not have reacted 
because of the budget matters — just to save the money, we could call it a crime 
against the citizens as it could have caused a lot of victims. exposing their own 
society to such a danger could be a serious charge but what is interesting, no-
body accused Ministry of health or the government of Poland of such a thing. 
Maybe the risk was not so great and it can be assumed that it only depended on 
the international pressure which Polish authorities could cope with.
The best in this situation would be if the talks would be mediated by the 
who officials who should share the responsibility with the pharmaceutical 
companies. such would be the role of who — mediator or even organiser of 
the transaction as the specialists of the global sense. From the perspective of 
coordination and credibility in the face of possible bioterrorism threat it would 
be best if who would take such a burden on its shoulders.
reAl ANd possible effects of polisH positioN
half a year later “The council’s committee on social, health and Family af-
fairs said that the health Ministry’s decision not to order any a/h1n1 vaccines, 
in spite of pressure from pharmaceutical companies and health organizations, 
was correct”23. of course such statement cannot be the prove that Polish au-
thorities were in fact right in their actions. This is only one of the voices in the 
ongoing discussion, but we can hardly find anyone who openly criticize Polish 
authorities. Most of such critics can be found in Poland and we can surely ac-
cept that it is only political fight and not a real opposition. 
22 Polish economics, The washington times, april 23, 2009.
23 Poland praised for anti-swine flu strategy, The news.pl from March 31, 2010. http://www.
beyondconformity.co.nz/_literature_85235/influenza_Poland_no_vaccine.
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situation of Poland was even more complicated because of ukrainian prob-
lems with h1n124. in that country in the second half of 2009 there were many 
cases of people infected and. it put a special pressure as the borders between 
these two countries are also external borders of the european union. That situ-
ation made Poland responsible for the pandemic spread from the east. it came 
out quickly that the preventive measures taken by ukrainian authorities were 
ones of the strongest in europe. it is also necessary to know internal ukrainian 
relation to examine news flow from that country. Presidential elections in that 
time made many reporters find the size of the panic as artificially enforced by 
the politicians. some of them wanted just to show some radical actions toward 
“rescuing of the citizens” which they expected would help in the elections25. 
in that case the border between european union and ukraine was closed for 
some time, but there was nothing more about it as Polish authorities knew well 
the internal relations in the neighbouring country. 
what is also important in this situation is that even if we treat Polish resigna-
tion from buying vaccines for h1n1 as the right decision, not everything can 
be regarded as the correct policy. especially in the cases of bioterrorism risk, 
not only the real security of the people is important, but also their subjective 
feeling of being secure. in this case there were many things which authorities 
could have done better. Moreover there were the same mistakes as for who’s 
officials: lack of compact and clear information and messages to the health care 
institutions across the country. it would in the first row inform the medical per-
sonnel about the situation, some special methods of treatment or the prognosis 
for the future. it would also give the feeling that authorities are not disregard 
the problem even if their opinion is different then this of who. 
coNclusioNs
if we take bioterrorism readiness into consideration, such organisations as 
who should be the sources of most solutions during the crisis. without cred-
ibility their actions would be much more complicated. since 2009 the problem 
24 M. olik, Poland and the h1n1 Flu: calm and unvaccinated, a/h1n1 in Poland, Global 
research, november 15, 2009. http://www.globalresearch.ca/. 
25 s. dorosh, Panic in ukraine over swine flu BBc ukrainian service, kiev, 3 november 
2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8338835.stm. accessed april 20, 2011
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of buying vaccines in a real threat situation has started to be not only medical 
but also political. here is the part of the six points showing main “Bioterrorism 
and emerging infections curriculum goals:
1. Be able to provide a basic knowledge of the characteristics of bioterror-
ism agents. 
2. Be able to recognize red flags and symptom complexes that could rep-
resent outbreaks. 
3. Be able to treat victims. 
4. Be able to protect yourself and other health care workers. 
5. Be able to understand the public health system and its interactions with 
clinicians. 
6. Be able to keep current with bioterrorism and emerging infections 
information”26.
Those curriculum points to be fulfilled need a good visibility and full in-
volvement into any international processes which are running on the scene. 
it is obvious that quick reaction is needed in case of bioterrorist attack. But 
especially these ordinary patients have to believe that in this case vaccines are 
crucial and there is no area for doubts. They have to be sure that nobody is 
playing political games and what is said by the officials is the one and the only 
solution even if they have to e.g. leave their houses or wait for help at home. 
such situations are very difficult as many people with different characters and 
political sympathies have to work together. 
For the bioterrorism prevention we need a highly respected agency whose 
main task in such a case would be to warn people27. we can be almost sure 
that when it comes to the situation in which such a warning is needed, not 
the politicians would be the right people to explain what is happening. even 
if they were, they would have to indicate the source and minister of health as 
one of the politicians will be the right source to some extent. however, in case 
of pandemic caused by bioterrorists all over the world, there would be a need 
26 M. cassoobhoy, s.F. wetterhall, d.F. collins, P.t. cantey, development of an interactive 
Bioterrorism and emerging infections curriculum for Medical students and internal Medicine 
residents, Public health report, 120, 2005, p. 60.
27 e. johnson avery, s. kim, anticipating or Precipitating crisis? health agencies May not 
Be heeding Best Practice advice in avian Flu Press releases, journal of Public relations re-
search 21(2), 2009, p. 187–197. 
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for an organization which is respected globally. and such is who. For that 
reason it is crucial for such agencies as the world health organisation to stay 
the most trusted and not infected by the politicians’ “electoral” rhetoric. as 
a main guideline we can add the strong need of cooperation between who, 
pharmaceutics companies and countries’ governments. in the presented situ-
ations the discrepancies between the statement were too huge to suppose that 
this cooperation was on some reasonable level. if we can find the answers, they 
are not clear in all points or does not answer to all points. who should play 
the role of mediator between governments, international organisations and 
pharmaceutical companies and others involved in the main processes during 
the bioterrorism threat situations.
we have to use our experience in fighting against the pandemics or epi-
demics which occurred in the history. The nowadays situations where diseases 
happens can be our only chance to prepare properly and to build the reliable 
security system against the bioterrorism threat. The lesson-learned have to 
be carefully studied and the conclusions by the academic circles should be 
discussed as detailed as possible because the stake is to high and the risk is 
too big. 
maciej milczanowski 
postAwA polsKi wobec pANdemii H1N1 i wiArygodNość wHo 
w KoNteKście zAgrożeNiA bioterroryzmem
streszczenie 
artykuł przedstawia problem wiarygodności who — jednej z najważniejszych 
organizacji globalnych odpowiedzialnych za informowanie i udzielanie wskazówek 
oraz rekomendacji w przypadku zagrożenia epidemiami, pandemiami czy możliwością 
wystąpienia ataku bioterrorystycznego. w związku z wyjątkową specyfiką zagrożenia 
bioterroryzmem jest szczególnie istotne, aby tego typu organizacja pozostawała poza 
wszelkimi podejrzeniami. niestety podejście do problemu h1n1 z lat 2009–2010 spo-
wodowało ogromny deficyt zaufania do tej organizacji, zarówno wśród społeczeństw, 
jak i w kręgach rządzących. komisja europejska przeprowadziła śledztwo w sprawie 
zasadności kupowania leków mających tę pandemię powstrzymać. najważniejsze, co 
ustaliła, to związki wielu doradców, którzy w tym czasie znaleźli się przy rządzących 
państwami, z firmami farmaceutycznymi, co bezpośrednio wpływało na podejmowa-
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nie decyzji o kupnie przez państwo leków przeciw pandemii. who wielokrotnie zale-
cała kupowanie szczepionek i podawanie ich całym populacjom krajów. te wszystkie 
aspekty powodują, że wiarygodność who jest dziś na znacznie niższym poziomie 
niż wcześniej. dzieje się tak w sytuacji, gdy bioterroryzm uznany został za największe 
zagrożenie ludzkości w najbliższej przyszłości. z tej perspektywy stanowisko rządu 
polskiego, stanowczo sprzeciwiającego się presji zakupów, jest warte szczegółowej ana-
lizy. wydaje się, że decyzja ta była podyktowana nie tylko względami finansowymi, 
ale przede wszystkim racjonalną oceną sytuacji. jednocześnie who powinna zmienić 
zasady postępowania w tego typu sytuacjach, stając się podmiotem biorącym odpo-
wiedzialność za rekomendowane rozwiązania, a nie tylko doradzającym. 

